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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BARBARA LYON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND
INDEMNITY COMP ANY,
Defendant arnd Appellant,
and

Case No.

12068

YOSEMITE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant.

Brief of Defendant and Appellant
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for benefits under the Uninsured
l\Iotorists Coverage of an automobile insurance policy.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was heard in the District Court of Salt
Lake County, Utah, The Honorable Gordon R. Hall, District Judge, Presiding, on cross motions for summary
.in(1;.?,"me>11t. The motion of plaintiff (Miss Lyon) was
granted in part and denied in part. The motions of de1
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fendant and appellant (The Hartford) and Yosemite
were denied. The Hartford appeals from the judgment
denying its motion and granting Miss Lyon's.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Hartford seeks reversal of the judgment and
judgment in its favor on its Motion for Summary Judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Miss Lyon was a passenger in a car driven by Bernie
Alex Martinez when that automobile was involved in
an accident caused by the joint negligence of Scott Gould
Nickel and Robert G. Butcher in the operation of automobiles by them. (R. 2). Miss Lyon obtained a judgment
against Nickel and Butcher in amount of $70,083.75.
(R. l).
Nickel did not have a nickle 's worth of liability insurance. Butcher had liability insurance but the policy limit
was $10,000. He paid $8,000 of that to Miss Lyon and
$2,000 into court because of a claim by The Hartford
that it was entitled to reimbursement of $2,000 paid under
the Medical Payments Provision of its policy. (R. 1).
Yosemite Insurance Company had issued an insurance policy covering Mr. Martinez and the automobile
in which Miss Lyon was riding at the time of the accident
which policy provided Uninsured Motorists Coverage of
$10,000. (R. 16).
2
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Yosemite refused payment initially, claiming that it
was entitled to credit for the $10,000 paid by Butcher, but
the trial court was not persuaded and Yosemite paid
rather than appeal. (R. 138).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
NO AMOUNT IS PAYABLE UNDER APPELLANT'S POLICY.
This is an action in contract.
The contract between the parties provides that any
amount otherwise payable under the Uninsured Motorists Clause shall be reduced by all sums paid on account
of the injury by or on behalf of either the operator of
the uninsured highway vehicle or any other person jointly
or sc•yerall~, liable for such in;jur~T. The precise language
of The Hartford's policy is:
"COVERAGE D - PROTECTION AGAINST
UNINSURED MOTORISTS: The company will
pay all sums which the insured ... shall be legally
entitled to recover as damages from the ... operator of an uninsured highway vehicle because of
bodily injury ... caused by accident ... and arising out of the ... use of such uninsured highway
vehicle." (R.42).
*
*
*
"LIMITS OF LIABILITY
(C) The limit for Coverage D - Uninsured Motorists stated in the declarations as applicable
to "each accident" is the total limit of the company's liability for all damages because of bodily
injuries snstained by one or more persons as the
result of any one accident.
3
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Any amount payable under Coverage D Uninsured Motorists because of bodily injuries
sustained in an accident by a person who is an
insured under this coverage shall be reduced by
(1) All sums paid on account of such bodily injury by or on behalf of ( i) the owner or
operator of the uninsured highway vhicle and
(ii) any other person or organization jointly
or severally liable together with such owner
or operator for such bodily injury . . . "
(R. 44).
The limits stated m the declarations is $20,000.
(R. 54).
There was paid on account of this injury $10,000 on
behalf of Butcher, a person jointly or severally liable
with :Nickel, the uninsured motorist. (R. 138).
The amount payable after application of the above
provision, would therefore, be $10,000.
However, the policy also provides that where the
insured person (Miss Lyon) is occupying a non-owned
automobile (Martinez) the Uninsured Motorists Coverage is excess over any other similar insurance available
to such insured. The provision is :
''OTHER INSURANCE: *
*
*
"With respect to bodily injury to an insured while
occupying an automobile not owned by the named
insured, the insurance under Coverage D - Uninsured Motorists shall apply only as excess insurance over any other similar insurance available
to such insured and application to such automobile
as primary insurance, and this insurance shall
4
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then apply only in the amount by which the limit
of liability for this coverage exceeds the applicable limit of liability of such other coverage."
(R. 44).
The respondent was occupying an automobile not
owned by her father or herself, but rather owned by Martinez. Similar insurance was available to her under
Martinez' policy, namely, $10,000 of Uninsured Motorist's Coverage provided by Yosemite Insurance Company.
This clause is clear and unambiguous. Similar language was held in Russell v. Paulson, 18 Utah 2d 157,
417 P.2d 658 (H)66), to preclude recovery under both the
owner's and the passenger's policy. In that case the passenger's policy, issued by Factory Mutual provided:
''Other Insurance.*
*
*
With respect to bodily injury to an insured
while occupying an automobile not owned by the
named insured the insurance hereunder shall apply only as excess insurance over any other similar insurarn.ce avwilable to such occupant, and this
insurance shall then apply only in the amount by
which the applicable limit of this part exceeds the
sum of the applicable limits of liability of all such
other insurance." (Emphasis added.)
rrhe Supreme Court said:
"Factory contends that its excess clause obligates it to pay only that amount by which the
limits of its policy exceed the limits of all other
available insurance. If applied to the facts of this
case, this contention would allow Factory to avoid
all liability. In support of this position Factory
5
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cites Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, Vol.
8, p. 400:

'* * * Where the owner of an automobile
or truck has a policy \Vith an omnibus clause,
and the additional insured also has a nonownership policy which provides that it shall
only constitute excess coverage over and
above any other valid, collectible insurance,
the owner's insurance has the primary liability.' " Russell at 660.
The court adopted this view, saying:
''The language is free and clear of ambiguity,
that since the limits of [the passengers] policy
did not exceed [the owners] excess coverage cannot be applied to [the passengers] policy." p. 662.
In this case, the Hartford undertook to make certain
that Miss Lyon would receive $20,000 if injured to that
extent by an uninsured motorist. Its undertaking was
not to pay that amount in addition to sums received from
other sources. On the contrary, its undertaking was to
be reduced by sums received from other sources.
In National Indemnity Co. v. Lead Supplies, Inc., 195
F. Supp. 249, 255 (1960), it was said:
"An insurance company, like any other obligor under a contract, cannot be held responsible
for more than it became obligated to perform.
Such obligations can only be determined from the
insuring agreements.''
See also Ephraim Theatre Company v. Hawk, 7 Utah
2d 163, 321 P.2d 221 (1958).
6
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POINT II
IN NO EVENT COULD RESPONDENT
BE LIABLE FOR MORE THAN $10,000 IN
THIS CASE.
If we ignore the fact that Miss Lyon has recovered
$10,000 from one of the wrongdoers, we have a case
where the policy issued by The Hartford is excess and
applies only in the amount which the limit of its liability
($20,000) exceeds the limit of the other coverage
($10,000) extended by Yosemite. The controlling proVlSlOn lS:

''OTHER INSURANCE:

*

*

*

"With respect to bodily injury to an insured
while occupying an automobile not owned by the
named insured, the insurance under Coverage
D - Uninsured Motorists shall apply only as
excess insurance over any other similar insurance available to such insured and applicable to
such automoblie as primary insurance, and that
insurance shall then apply only in the amount
by which the limit of liability for this coverage
exceeds the applicable limit of liability of such
other coverage." (R.44).
:Miss Lyon was injured while occupying an automohile not owned by her or her family. Other similar insurance was available to her through Yosemite. That insurance is primary and The Hartford's can be liable
only in the amount by which its limit ($20,000) exceeds
Yosemite's limit ($10,000). Russell v. Paulson, supra.
In 111 artin, et al. v. Christensen, et al., 22 Utah 2d
415, 454 P.2d 294 (1969), the court had before it a pro-
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v1s1on to the effect that no payment should be madC'
which would result in a total payment in excess of tlw
highest application limit of liability under two or mon'
policies applicable to a loss.
The company urged that the paragraph was designed
to provide coverage under one policy and to avoid thC'
effect of cumulative or multiple limits on a single accident where an insured has more than one policy and the
premiums are based upon the total exposure of risk on
the entire policy as written including the limitations.
This court said :
''There appears to be no ambiguity or uncertainty in the provision just quoted. It being thus
set forth as part of the insurance contract, in clear
and understandable terms, that where the Company has issued more than one policy to an insured, it will be liable only up to the maximum
coverage of its highest limit on any one policy for
any one accident or loss, it is the duty of the
courts to give it effect. This is true unless considerations of equity and justice, or of public policy, dictate that the contract should not be
enforced because of fraud, duress, mistake, unconscionability, illegality or some other such cogent reason. No such considerations are present
here.''
There is no way to sustain the lower court's judgment tlrnt The Hartford is liable for $20,000 without
writing a new contract for these parties.
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POINT III.
IF APPELLANT HAS LIABILITY UNDER
COVERAGE D - UNINSURED MOTORISTS,
IT rs ENTITLED TO SET-OFF THE $2,000
PAID UNDER THE MEDICAL PAYMENTS
COVERAGE WITHOUT ALLOWANCE OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES.

It is uncontroverted that a recovery was made
against one of the persons responsible for the accident.
If The Hartford is liable to Miss Lyon under the Uninsured Motorist Coverage, that liability should be reduced
hy the amount paid under the medical payments coverage.
The pertinent policy provisions are:
"COVERAGE B-MEDICAL EXPENSE:
The company will pay all reasonable medical expense incurred within one year from the date of
accident for bodily injury caused by accident and
sustained by the named insured or a relative ... ''
(R.42).
Subrogation: ''In the event of any payment under
Coverage B - Medical Expense of this policy, the
company shall be subrogated to all the rights of
recovery therefor in which the injured person or
anyone receiving such payment may have against
any person ... " (R. 47).
In State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Farmers Insu rarnce Exch., 22 Utah 2d 183, 450 P.2d 458 (1969), this
court held that such provision was valid. Judge Hall
correctly awarded $2,000 to The Hartford but erron-
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eously allowed attorneys' foes of $500
attorneys.

to .Miss Lyon's

There was no showing that Butcher's insurer was
not willing to pay the limit of its policy to whomever was
entitled to receiYe it. There was no showing that The
Hartford accepted the benefits of Mr. J\IcRae 's efforts
under circumstances implying an obligation to pay. Mr.
l\IcRac was ackerse to The Hartford.
To allow attorneys' fees in such a situation would
he to subsidize Mr. McRae 's efforts to recover against
The Hartford without either rule of law or contractual
provision so pro\·iding contrary to the decision of this
court in Blake v. Blake, 17 Utah 2cl 369, 412 P.2d 454

(1966).
CONCLUSION
The Hartford's policy provides that if Miss Lyo11
is i1ffolved in an automobile accident with an uninsured
motorist and sustains injuries as a result, it will see that
she cai1 collect any judgmrnt up to $20,000. She has collected $20,000. This is the extrnt of Thr Hartford's 1111dertaking.
This intent is expressrd hy clear and unambiguous
language. The $20,000 limit is to be reduced by thr
$10,000 received from Butcher's insurer. The applicable
limit, as so amended, is $10,000. The coverage is excess
over the $10,000 extended by Yosemite. Therefore, no
amount is payable under The Hartford's policy.
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But if the court concludes that some amount is payable, under no interpretation of the policy can this
amount exceed $10,000 less the full $2,000 paid by The
Hartford under its Medical Payments Coverage.
Respectfully submitted,

WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN
and HAROLD G. CHRISTENSEN
7th Floor, Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant
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